The Transfer of Parental Responsibilities
Many argued the responsibility principle is false: gamete donors don’t acquire parental responsibilities towards “their” children. But perhaps their arguments are unsound, and that the responsibility principle is true – would it be the case that gamete donors treat their responsibility too lightly? To answer this question, we need to know what responsibility gamete donors (typically) take with respect to the use of their gametes, and we need to know what it would be to take one’s parental responsibilities seriously.
What conditions are permissible to transfer one’s parental responsibilities? (Here the issue at question is not about the transfer of responsibility for children with whom emotional attachments have been formed, – the issue concerns the parental responsibilities for gametes, or, perhaps, the embryo which has been formed from the gametes). It is morally permissible to transfer one’s parental obligations only when one is mentally or financially incompetent to discharge them. The sum of responsibilities for rearing children, are of the weighty sort such that, in the absence of compelling reasons, one ought not to transfer them to others, even if others are equally competent to bear them.
Some reject the transfer principle, according to which it is permissible to alienate one’s parental responsibilities (over neonates) to another individual (or institution) as long as one has good reason to think that they will carry out those responsibilities adequately.
What also can be said against the transfer principle? Regardless of these principles unpopularity there is relatively little in the way of serious discussion of it.
There is presented the following scenario in an attempt to undermine it:
The child has to be rushed to hospital and parent charges his neighbour with this task, while parent stays home to water the plants. Having no reasonable explanation of this behavior, we would argue that parent had failed to take seriously his responsibility to care for the child. He has indeed failed to take his parental responsibilities seriously, but this is because parent’s neighbor isn’t equally competent to bear parental responsibilities, even if she can drive as fast and safely as parent. Parental responsibilities aren’t restricted to getting his child to the hospital quickly and safely, they also include providing the appropriate emotional support. Most probably parent has a closer relationship to his child than his neighbor does, and probably the child would rather be taken to hospital by her father than by the neighbor. Parental responsibilities may also include making medical decisions on behalf of his child, and since parent’s neighbor won’t be in an on-going relationship with the child she is obviously not well-placed to make such decisions.
As a result this scenario fails to undermine the transfer principle.
Another line of attack on the transfer principle.
One can argue that the transfer principle ignores the fact that parental responsibilities arise out of a kind of promise. Probably, bringing a child into existence involves an implicit promise to look after the child. One can argue that the obligations generated by promises cannot be transferred to others. Of course, bringing a child into existence involves an implicit promise to the child in question, but what is the content of that promise? The objection take for granted that one promises to take care of the child oneself. But, the promise may only be to ensure that the child is taken care of.
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